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Abstract
The new paradigms of public administration are strongly based on greater interaction between the state,
private sector and society through actions based on networks, co-production, and collaborative gover-
nance. However, several characteristics of civil society organizations or non-governamentals organizations
(NGO) bring limitations to an effective long-term partnership. This paper aims to describe and ana-
lyze the limitations of NGOs that may affect these partnerships and the nature of this organizations,
with reference to the Brazilian context, since the institutional environment and regulatory framework is
critical to understand these limitations. Based on a meta analysis in former studies that assessed the
relationship between NGO and the state, it was possible to point as the main problems for the NGOs
from this relationships.
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Introduction
The new paradigms of public administration are
strongly based on greater interaction between the
state, private sector and society through actions
based on networks, co-production, and collabora-
tive governance. However, several characteristics
of civil society organizations or non-governamentals
organizations (NGO) bring limitations to an effec-
tive long-term partnership. Partnerships between
the state and NGOs may distort the very nature of
these organizations as representative of interests of
society, as it may reduce their advocacy role, their
financial independence, their accountability orien-
tation and the perception by the attended public
as different from the state, not a part of it (ma-
nufactured society). This paper aims to describe
and analyze the role, characteristics and limitations
of NGOs when operating these partnerships, with
reference to the Brazilian context, since the insti-
tutional environment and regulatory framework is
critical to understand these limitations.
Despite numerous proposals of several authors,
there is no universal taxonomy for classifying the
various types of NGOs in the broader set of third
sector organizations. In Brazil, 300,000 organiza-
tions are classified in official statistics as NGOs,
characterized as private, nonprofit, voluntary, self-
managed and targeted at improving the quality of
life of unassisted population. For a significant por-
tion of these organizations, however, government
resources are critical to its operation, especially
after the international economic crisis of the late
1990s, although they can may reduce their free-
dom of action and political independence from the
state, and redirect the accountability of NGOs to
the government-contractor and not to the populati-
ons served. Identified by Hodgson (2004) as ‘manu-
factured civil society’, this relationship can damage
the identity of the NGO and produce a mixture
between the state and voluntary sector organizati-
ons.
The possibility of accessing public funds may also
stimulate a political capture, when NGOs become
propagating the ideas of political groups, sacrifi-
cing, in this role, their ability to critique the actions
of the state. Another problem is the foundation of
NGOs by politicians or their families only to facili-
tate or legitimize access to public funds under their
management.
An important discussion about the state-NGO
relationship refers to the possibility of masking, in
fact, a process of outsourcing by the state. To es-
cape the restrictions of hiring staff or services, agre-
ements with NGOs could be used to meet demands
without increasing fixed costs or size of the state,
with gains in speed and flexibility in hiring. But,
of course, it brings many problems and pitfalls for
the NGOs.
The 300 companies listed on stock exchanges in
Brazil are subject to intense scrutiny by the mar-
ket, investors´ associations and government agen-
cies. This external control, however, is impractical
for NGOs. Besides being about 300 thousand in
Brazil, there is a wide variety of legal types, field
of activity, size and skills, making it virtually im-
possible for the external control exercised by the
state or other actors. According to Weidenbaum
(2009), NGOs charges accountability of companies
and governments, but rarely has mechanisms of go-
vernance to be accountable for their own activities.
In turn, the proposals of collaborative governance
and New Public Governance write about the im-
portance of tacit contracts, reducing the formality
in relations between the parties involved. There-
fore, there remains the challenge of easing relations
between the state and civil society organizations
without reducing the independence and nature of
the NGOs or create spaces for irregular or illegal
actions by the actors.
In order to analyze the role and characteristics
of NGOs in partnerships with the state in Brazil,
it is first discussed the concept and classification
of NGOs, the new paradigms in public adminis-
tration that review the importance of the relations
NGO-state, and then investigate what happens in
the Brazilian context based on a revision of several
recent studies that assessed this issue.
How paradigms changed in pu-
blic administration
Public administration (in a broad concept), as well
as public management (the efficient search of the
goals proposed by the administration and politi-
cal system), are two fields that have to go through
strong adaptations to respond to changes in the
demands of the society, whenever technology, eco-
nomy, political environment and other aspects de-
liver new possibilities for the state to capture, un-
derstand and attend the expectations of the society.
The idea of paradigms, as proposed by Kuhn
(1970), refers to a set of ideas or articulated scienti-
fic achievements that drive models that are the ba-
sis for the research problems in a particular field of
knowledge or a group of researchers, or the techni-
cal certainty and consensus characterizing a field of
study (Pfeffer, 1993). In Kuhn’s words, paradigms
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that for a time provide model problems and soluti-
ons for a community of practitioners” (1970: viii).
Lu (2013) uses the development of Kuhn to dis-
cuss the paradigms in the field of public adminis-
tration, recalling the self-doubt in this author to
expand its use from the natural sciences to the so-
cial sciences, noting however that in most social
sciences it is rare to observe the paradigm shift,
but is frequent a “parallel paradigm”, that is, the
coexistence of several competing paradigms.
Even if taking a less rigid approach to the concept
of paradigm, its employment to locate the changes
in the set of ideas, assumptions and propositions
in the field of public administration is useful to
systematize the different movements that prevai-
led over the past few years. Lu (2013) also men-
tions the six successive paradigms that public ad-
ministration theory went through as identified by
the Henry (2010) of the politics / administration
dichotomy (1900-1926), principles of public admi-
nistration (1927-1937), public administration the
political science (1950 to 1970), the public admi-
nistration management (1950-1970) public admi-
nistration the public administration (1970-present)
and governance (1990-present). Interestingly, using
similar reference to assess changes in public admi-
nistration in Brazil –context that will later be used
for analysis– Keinert (1994) observed an interrela-
tion of these ideas, or paradigms, mainly from the
mid-twentieth century, although with the evidence
of a time lag translating them into this national
context.
Presenting the New Public Management (NPM)
as a new set of ideas and differentiate their doctrinal
components of those present in other sets of prac-
tices of public administration, Hood (1991) placed
a new paradigm, from an opposition to the bases
of the previous paradigm, and positioned a land-
mark that has served as a beacon to the ideas in
this field. The NPM is understood as a response
to the dysfunctions of bureaucracy, and later mo-
vements as a response to the concerns about ’new
public management’ (O’Flynn, 2007).
Pestoff (2011) proposes that each paradigm in
public administration is associated to a particular
ideology and historical period, and must be seen as
competing and layered realities that co-exist for po-
liticians, managers and in the academic and public
discourse. He uses the citizens´ perspective to pro-
pose that changes in their roles, in the relationship
with the state, are connected with the evolution
of the paradigms. At first, citizens were descri-
bed as passive users or beneficiaries of the public
administration, under the scope of the traditional
public administration ideology. Then, they turned
into customers, with some voice in the scope and
content of services, in the era of the New Public
Management. More recently, citizens are seen as
co-producers, responsible for playing a more direct
role in the provision of services, in the so-called
Networked Governance paradigm.
Many authors divide the paradigms of public ad-
ministration around three different moments, simi-
lar to those proposed by Pestoff (2011). Osborne
(2006) is one of this authors. For him, the hege-
mony of Public Administration, which last from
the late nineteenth century through to the early
1980s, was replaced by the NPM paradigm and the
assumption that the application of managerial te-
chniques to public services would bring improve-
ments in the efficiency and effectiveness of these
services, and now we see the emergence of a new pa-
radigm called the New Public Governance (NPG).
According to Pestoff (2011), New Public Manage-
ment (NPM) is based on active service consumers
and contracting out through public private part-
nerships, and New Public Governance (NPG) is ba-
sed on co-production, multi-stakeholder governance
and third sector provision of welfare services.
Osborne (2006) sheds light in an increasingly
inter-organizational nature of public management,
which involves a huge increase in the number of ac-
tors involved in policy formulation and implementa-
tion. He points as the main characteristics of NPG
the strengthening of institutional relations with so-
ciety; networks between organizations within and
outside of government to provide public services; re-
lationships based on trust and relational contracts
(a contract whose effect is based on a relationship
of trust between the parties); state understood as
a plural body; New Public Governance based on
sociological theories and networks
In parallel to changing paradigms, theories and
associated epistemological bases also migrate from
a rationality based on formalism, legal, and defini-
tion of operational standards to a rationality do-
minated the quest for efficiency and coordination.
The main change to the paradigm of network and
governance in public administration refers to a gre-
ater participation and representation of stakehol-
ders in the design, construction and production of
public policies. Therefore, the new models are ro-
oted within organizational sociology and network
theory (Osborne, 2006), not in the logic of public
choice and agency theory.
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Classifying NGOs
According to DiMaggio y Anheier (1990), the na-
ture of the activity “nonprofit” does not have a
trans-historical significance or transnational, as the
functions, origins and behavior in this sector reflect
specific legal definitions, cultural heritage and pu-
blic policies of different nations and societies. This
observation refers to the difficulty in generalizing
international learning and appropriate them direc-
tly to the national reality (Carver, 2001; Cornforth,
2003; Lee et al, 2008; Malo, 2006; Ruys et al., 2007).
Thus, the absence of recognized standards to pro-
pose a classification of its structures and practices,
and to allow adequate international generalization
may constitute a difficulty to evaluate the effecti-
veness of the NGOs contribution and thus impede
access to government resources or other donor or-
ganizations or donor.
The development of classifications for organiza-
tions in the third sector is challenging, as there is
no general consensus related to what is its defini-
tion. Actually, Pestoff & Brandsen (2009) afirm
that the third sector may have many different na-
mes, such as the voluntary sector, the non-profit
sector, the social economy, civil society, and many
others with a large degree of overlap. Hudson y Bi-
elefeld (1997) consider that international research
on nonprofits is difficult because what constitutes
this nonprofit sector varies greatly across countries,
and are named as different as nongovemment, para-
government, private voluntary, and community as-
sociations, and assume as many form as foundati-
ons, corporations, associations, and so on. Howe-
ver, there is some consensus that they are located
between the state and the for-profit sector.
Vakil (1997) states that the lack of consensus in
defining and classifying the nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) inhibits the possible theoretical
and empirical advances to understand how NGOs
function, for which he proposes a classification.
Not only the field of NGOs demand appropriate
models or classification structures, but also some
constructs used in studies of these organizations.
To Lima Neto (2013), the NGOs, according to a
general definition, it can be considered as civil so-
ciety itself proxy. To Mitchell (2014), civil society
must be understood as a complex construct with
multiple interpretations, with ambiguity and con-
tradiction, with the diverse perspectives of an arena
of Tocquevillian of “associational life,” as an Aris-
totelian “good society” and an Habermasian deli-
berative “public sphere”.
Main models of relationship
State-NGOs in Brazil
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statis-
tics (IBGE) is responsible for mapping the private
foundations and non-profit organizations in Bra-
zil, which is disclosed in the document FASFIL
(stands for Private Foundations and Non-Profit As-
sociations). FASFIL defined third sector organiza-
tions following the methodology presented in the
Handbook on Non-Profit Institutions in the system
of national accounts, issued by the United Nation
and the John Hopkins University, in 2002, in or-
der to permit international comparisons. In this
sense, to be included in the sample organizations
must meet five criteria: Organized, i.e., institu-
tionalized to some extent; Private, i.e., instituti-
onally separate from government; Self-governing,
i.e., equipped to control their own activities; Non-
profit-distributing, i.e., not returning profits gene-
rated to their owners or directors; Voluntary, i.e.,
involving some meaningful degree of voluntary par-
ticipation.
Three types of organizations meet these criteria,
under Brazilian law: associations, foundations and
religious organizations. While an association is for-
med by the union of people and is organized for
non-economic purposes, the foundation is created
by a settlor who allocates resources to compose its
equity, specifies the purpose for which it is intended
and how to manage it.
The study identified 290,700 organizations offici-
ally registered in 2010. They represented 5.2% of
the total of 5.6 million public and private, profit and
non-profit entities registered in the Central Regis-
ter of Enterprises (CEMPRE), and included 28.5%
predominantly religion-based, 15.5% employer and
professional associations, 14.6% development and
protection of rights and 18.66% in the areas of he-
alth care, education, research and social welfare
(governmental policies). Another study conducted
by Brazil’s Institute of Independent Auditors in-
dicated that the volume of resources handled by
the third sector in Brazil accounted for about 5%
of gross domestic product (Instituto dos Auditores
Independentes do Brasil, 2011: 20).
The analysis of the available data in FASFIL in-
dicates that the prime aim of the non-profit founda-
tions and organizations is to protect citizens’ rights
and interests and disseminate religious precepts.
However, the slight rise in the average of employees
in these organizations, from 6.9 in 2006 to 7.3 in
2010 should be analyzed bearing in mind the high
degree of informality regarding employment rela-
tionship, so that this figure might be significantly
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In 2010, there were, on average, 7.3 salaried em-
ployed persons per entity, with variations of 224.8
workers (in hospitals) to 1.8 workers per entity (in
religion). However, in 72.2% of NGOs there was
not even a single formal worker registered for the
year of 2010, which suggests that they are strongly
supported by volunteer work and freelance services,
possibly with a low degree of formalization and lit-
tle capacity to participate tenders and bids for ac-
cess to third-party resources, including the state.
Despite this coverage in operations and econo-
mic and social impact, NGOs need to be improved
in terms of transparency, legal certainty, and qua-
lity of external controls by the lack of operational
capacity of the covenants. The absence of a clear
regulatory framework leaves the organization under
the discretion and the jurisprudence of the courts
of auditors responsible for overseeing these organi-
zations (Coelho, 2013). In addition, this regulatory
absence implies a low standardization in governance
settings and organizational practices used by these
NGOs. The models of board, selection of board
members, collective decision practices, goal setting
for structures, rendering of accounts, transparency
and accountability, project selection and manage-
ment structures have very different ways and pat-
terns between these NGOs, inhibiting the evaluati-
ons of advantages or disadvantages of the different
configurations, and reducing the efficiency of go-
vernment and social performance control.
The development of the third sector in Brazil,
while activity carried out by a private law organi-
zation in order to develop initiatives to the public
interest, appears initially in the sixteenth century.
Because of the strict link with Portugal, the appe-
arance of the first social support structures takes
place through private religious institutions and of
individual voluntary initiatives that reflected the
conservatism of an elite society (Graef y Salgado,
2009). In a sense, the establishment of social assis-
tance was associated, from the seventeenth century
to the 1930s, to the notion of charity and donations
for the “disadvantaged population”.
These activities were practiced by altruistic indi-
viduals or religious appointed institutions. It was
only during the government of Getulio Vargas go-
vernment, in the 1930´s, that the State assumed
responsibility, albeit in a patronizing manner, of
the issues related to social assistance. It stands out
in this period the creation of the National Social
Service Council in 1938 and, years later, in 1942,
the Brazilian Legion of Assistance - LBA. Social
assistance as a right was only officially designated
as a responsibility of the State in the new Federal
Constitution, in 1988, when it reached the status of
social right guaranteed by the allocation of public
budget funds of social security among other sources
(Article 203 IV, Article 204, I and II).
Although the role of the State as responsible for
social welfare activities was made official by the Fe-
deral Constitution of 1988, its activities in the exer-
cise of this responsibility could never exceed the li-
mits of education and health fields, which gave rise
to the establishment of several institutions that be-
gan, themselves, to meet the social needs not cove-
red by the state.
It was only with the Federal Constitution of 1988
that the social care was recognized as a social right,
although there have not been implemented measu-
res to guarantee this recognition, mainly due to the
strong conservative influence that subsists in the
country, expressed in paternalistic practices adop-
ted by government agencies and in the power of
the philanthropic entities, who sits on the survival
of the oligarchies and in the huge welfare structure.
The fact is that apart from the health and educa-
tion sectors, the Brazilian government never acted,
in fact, in the social area, which gave rise to the
establishment of the network of welfare instituti-
ons, linked mainly to the churches, especially the
Catholic Church, builded up over five centuries of
history of the country (Graef y Salgado, 2009).
These institutions, according to the Brazilian Ci-
vil Code (Law No. 10.406, of January 10, 2002 Ar-
ticle 44), legal framework that deals with the legal
status of organizations in general (but not corpora-
tions), are characterized as legal entities of private
law and are contained in the environment of non-
profit organizations. The concept of third sector
has begun to be addressed in the first half of the
twentieth century in the United States as a com-
bination between the public sector, represented by
the State and the private sector, highlighting the
already discussed difficult to define given the mul-
tiplicity of organizations such as associations, foun-
dations, political parties, clubs, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations of
public interest (OSCIP), among others, possessing
purposes and distinct natures, often unrelated to
each other (Graef y Salgado, 2009). The key point
is that NGOs are not companies and neither are
part of the state structure, subject to public law).
The Civil Code also provides that in cases provi-
ded by law NGOs can have a different legal regime,
receiving for example the Social Organization at-
tribute (OS) or Civil Society Organization of Inte-
rest, conditions that allow them special situations
in contracts with the State.
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NGOs can establish a legal relationship with the
State by contract or agreement, which are quite
distinct instruments. In the agreement, the recipro-
cal interest and mutual cooperation prevails, both
parties ? NGOs and state ? aims common ins-
titutional goals, and the remuneration is made in
advance, being forbidden the presence of any profit.
In the contract, the goals are private and contra-
dictory, the contractor expects to receive the good
or service and the hired the remuneration, with the
remunration made after delivery of the good or ser-
vice, accepting profit.
Although the regulations and the limited cur-
rent regulatory framework establish purpose, rules
of operation, supervision and internal monitoring
tools, this regulatory set rises a diffuse control, frag-
mented and disjointed in different instances in the
conduct of modes of governance of these organizati-
ons. This is more significant especially considering
that there are three government instances in the
country ? federal, state and municipalities ? all
authorized to perform contracts with NGOs, and
the regulation is still fragile especially with regard
to contracts for the states and municipalities.
Is worth noting that the installation process and
maturation of activities of NGOs in Brazil is stron-
gly linked to the political process. The Brazil lived
under a regime or dictatorship in the period from
March 1964 to January 1985, with the election, in-
direct, of a civilian president. As analyzes Thomas
(2009), during this period the work of social move-
ments was strongly marked by the joint against the
state, around the democratization of the country
and the achievement of various social rights and
against censorship of expression and communica-
tion.
With democratization, there was a change of di-
rection and operation of NGOs, with increasing
professionalization and quantitative and geographic
expansion. NGOs started to compete for resources
and government contracts, and to seek a more en-
trepreneurial logic of operation, as well as greater
support and credibility in society.
This social support brought not only legitimacy
but also resources for projects. With the interna-
tional crisis of the late 1990s and the improvement
of the country in international economic rankings
the country turned into an exporter of resources,
not more receptor, leading national NGOs to seek
new sources of revenue, either by contributions and
donations of society or state resources.
According to Thomas (2009), the role of NGOs
have been held in the provision of social services for
reasons of “alleged” operational agility and trans-
parency of costs, and for bringing greater involve-
ment of organized society. However, this is leading
to an appreciation of utilitarian nature, since the
engagement of NGOs allows handle unsatisfied so-
cial demands and the decrease in government spen-
ding and the range of social programs, reducing
pressure on the government. And summarizes the
current situation of the relationship between social
movements, NGOs and State with the statement
made by Montan˜o (2003: 273), for whom “from
the struggle (of the social movements), one passes
to a moment of trading (between NGOs and state),
followed by the management of conflicting interests
(people’s organizations), and then to a patronage
relationship. ”
Characteristics and limitations
in the relationship State-NGOs
in Brazil
To study the main characteristics and limitations
of NGOs that may affect these partnerships, with
reference to the Brazilian context, it was developed
an analysis and reflection based in former studies,
especially related to the Brazilian context, that as-
sessed the relationship between NGO and the state,
limited to those that are developed under a formal
contract.
A set of 25 articles published in academic jour-
nals on topics related to the relationship between
NGOs and the State in Brazil were selected for
analysis and collected, as well as a set of 42 news-
paper articles and journals since 1990 that directly
or indirectly dealt with these issues . The collection
did not follow a structured process, being the gui-
ded collection by the prioritization of the articles
in consultation in the systems Google and Google
Scholar. The reading of the texts guided, in an
inductive way, the main aspects of the analysis.
The expression that best synthesizes the relati-
onship between NGOs and the state in Brazil is pre-
sented by Lima Neto (2013): “a partnership with
the state is a two-way street”, as it allows enhance
the results of NGOs and simultaneously brings a se-
ries of obstacles and bureaucratic constraints that
compromise their autonomy. Based on interviews
with 50 NGO managers seeking to understand their
auto perception of profile and performance, Lima
Neto (2013) noted that NGOs consider that the in-
teraction or conflict with the state is something al-
most inevitable in their everyday chores, as both
share similar social functions, but their agility, fle-
xibility and proximity to the target audience, seems
sufficient to a more individualized monitoring. At
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about the importance of using partnerships with
NGOs for the state to increase their ability to un-
derstand and deal with a fragmented set of social
demands. The NGOs also perceive themselves as
less vulnerable to political influence and therefore
more independent.
Regarding the partnerships with the state, res-
pondent leaders understand that bring many bene-
fits and certainly problems. The partnership allows
better understanding of the functioning of public
administration, and brings credibility and visibility
to the NGO. It also allows expanding its range of
operations to other audiences and places and espe-
cially increasing the fundraising. Downsides would
be the bureaucracy of the state, with overly bur-
densome requirements for accountability and parti-
cipation in public notices. Other problems would be
government interference, delays in payments, stiff-
ness spending and especially the discontinuity of
the actions caused by government changes.
It is interesting to contrast the perception of le-
aders for contracts with companies. These are seen
as much less bureaucratic, mainly because compa-
nies are concerned with results rather than proce-
dures, and greater mobility in the application of re-
sources. However, for many respondents such part-
nerships can bring negative impacts to the image
and reputation of NGOs, to be eventually percei-
ved as advertising tools or marketing companies, in
addition to the companies expect quantifiable re-
sults and are less sensitive.
The weakness of the legal framework has also
brought serious problems also for NGOs-state re-
lations, especially the possibilities of political cap-
ture by interest groups, and detours of its purpose.
In this sense, between 2007 and 2010 the Natio-
nal Congress conducted an investigation (the Parli-
amentary Commission of Inquiry) on money trans-
fers occurring by the federal government to NGOs
linked both to the government itself as the allied
political parties, according to the suspects agree-
ments between the federal government and such en-
tities were being used as a means of diverting public
money. In the end, the investigation was comple-
ted and generated a report with more than 1,478
pages, but that ended shelved without direct con-
sequences, but it certainly cast doubt on the state
of the partnership with the NGOs.
Ojeda (2012) analyzes that these accusations pla-
ced focus on the lack of adequate control and su-
pervision over the work of NGOs, especially given
the major growth of public funds they received. In
addition to financial problems, criticism was that
some sort of outsourcing of the State activities and
responsibilities to society was taking place. Based
on the analysis of other authors, he also states that
during the period of dictatorship NGOs were ob-
served virtuously, since they represented a tool of
social issues resolutions and claiming, but like any
other organization they may incur in managerial
problems, or be influenced by partisan political lo-
gic, present in various entities supposedly nonprofit.
Moreover, in the words of one NGO leader about
why parliamentary investigations have not advan-
ced, “For almost every deputy has your NGO. The
parliamentary amendments are for it. It is a way
to create the electoral corral. I will not say all di-
vert money. But they serve at least to create their
stronghold. ”
Carrying out a case study in a NGO with more
than 50 offices in the country, and working in the
development area and emergency programs, Ckag-
nazaroff and Souza used as an analytical layout the
differentiation proposed in Lewis (2001) between
active partnership when the NGO has certain au-
tonomy of action and can discuss the project with
the state, sharing risks and capable of learning and
information exchange, the dependent partnership,
where the state sets the project to be pursued, with
no room for discussion, predominantly top-down
guidance, rigid roles based on the comparative ad-
vantages of actors, and individual interests.
The authors observed that those partnerships
that left a closed project from the state govern-
ment, top to bottom, had focused on a particu-
lar policy or government demand, getting the NGO
responsible only for the execution of tasks, and li-
mited the methodological choices, once the choice
of participatory methods was not accepted by the
government agency, which adopted a paternalistic
and centralizing stance. In addition, they unders-
tand that there was a risk of co-optation of NGOs
by the state government.
In general, they analyzed that the state-NGO
partnerships brings problems in four aspects. First,
for the budgetary constraints and extra costs due to
state delays. Second, the administrative continuity
of the state could have the effect of interrupting
projects and bring in frustration to the community
and harm the image of the NGO. Third, shocks due
to differences in culture, as members of NGOs may
be perceived as more motivated to get the job done
and civil servants as working for further financial
gain through overtime. And fourth, as the diffe-
rence in the operating mode when the bureaucracy
of State organs may hinder the progress of projects.
Assessing the nature of relations between Envi-
ronmental NGOs and the state in one unit of the
federation, Thomas (2009) assumes that, since the
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1990s, decentralization of activities by the Brazilian
government has contributed to increase the sha-
ring of responsibilities towards solutions to social
problems, and NGOs perceived as intermediates in
their relationship with civil society and as a effec-
tive executors projects, which justifies delegating
public functions to entities belonging to various so-
cial movements. It is interesting to observe, in this
study, that are compared two NGOs created at dif-
ferent times, the first in the early 1980s still during
the dictatorial situation in the country and the se-
cond in 1990, already during the resumption of the
democratic stage. While the first adopted a highly
critical position to the partnerships with the State,
the second had partnerships exactly as an operati-
onal strategy.
The history of these two entities is quite diffe-
rent, but in general converging for greater professi-
onalism and access to public and private resources.
As for the oldest NGOs, there appears to be a hard
time accepting this new situation, since they point
to the paradox that while environmental issues and
demands for social mobilization are growing, vo-
luntarism and militancy have decreased, moreover
the use of money from financiers decreases the de-
nunciation’s acting capability and social struggle.
In addition, the use of these resources produces a
fragmentation on the expectations of leaders and
activists about their impact on the autonomy of the
body against the government and funding agencies.
For the youngest NGO, the volunteer figure does
not exist, being considered as “complicated”, since
it cannot be demanded, as it has no formal link.
The NGO has been created in the professional mo-
del, unlike the first, does not guides its action by
confrontation but by the quest for reconciling inte-
rests.
Assessing the recent history of the relationship
between NGOs and state in Brazil, the numbers
show that since 1990 there has been both a sig-
nificant increase in the number of NGOs and the
volume of public funds they receive.
Final remarks
Situation analysis of NGO-State relationship in
Brazil identifies circumstances that can be of bene-
fit to the state, but can also bring harm to NGOs in
the medium and long term. Moreover, these losses
should not be attributed only to individual organi-
zations, but to the entire system and, ultimately,
to the very credibility of NGOs in society.
As seen, the partnership with the state is for the
NGO the possibility of establishing a strategic part-
nership that enhances their results, but simultane-
ously has a number of bureaucratic obstacles and
impediments that can compromise their autonomy.
In a way it is possible to even question the assertion
of the authors analyzed, for whom the partnership
of NGOs with the state is a two-way street, since
it is perceived by managers both as a major obsta-
cle to its operations but also as a lever for projects
of NGOs. Perhaps what is predominating in these
partnerships is outsourcing process by the state, to
which the NGOs are accommodating.
Actually, a former study in a Brazilian state
which analyzed partnerships from the government
with civil society organizations showed the predom-
inance of agency-type partnerships and the central-
ity of the government and a techno-bureaucratic
role in fostering and maintaining the NGOs, what
they call as an “invasion” of manufactured civil so-
ciety (Peci et al., 2011).
For the state, within the NPG logic, it is cer-
tainly important to rely on the reach of NGOs and
proximity to target populations, allowing certain
individuality in the treatment of demands. How-
ever, local flexibility and proximity of these NGOs
can, over time, become contaminated by the state
bureaucracy, mimicking their processes and becom-
ing quasi-public organizations.
The critical point is noted that the partnership
can increase the dependence of the NGO regarding
public resources, eventually harming the focus of
their actions or accountability. Thus, the NGO be-
comes more concerned with meeting the demands
of the government that the society in which it oper-
ates, and directing their accountability to the gov-
ernment (and not the company). Moreover, this
dependence can create a concern for “not complete
the services and extinguish the problem” in order to
continue to receive public funds or give rise to op-
portunistic interests to perpetuate trouble to keep
their financed.
Access to public funds may also stimulate polit-
ical capture and reproduction of dominant ideolo-
gies. Recently, trade union movements and student
organizations were accused of promoting demon-
strations in favor of the government because of a po-
litical capture (Magnoli, 2015), and former Brazil-
ian President threatened to call the social move-
ments of the landless to hold demonstrations, as an
“army” to defend the government (Haubert, 2015).
Finally, the perspective of the state partnership
with the NGOs can be full of benefits, these benefits
have yet to be evaluated further. There remains
the challenge of easing relations between the state
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and civil society organizations without reducing the
independence of the company or create spaces for
irregular or illegal actions by the actors.
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